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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of a method of constructing attitude scales by 
objective evaluation of opinion statements (Thurstone and Chave, 1929) 
has stimulated a great deal of research concerning social judgment. 
The method proposed by Thurstone is based on the assumption that an in-
dividual is able to make judgments of an attitude domain independently 
of his own position within that domain. This assumption however, has 
not received consistent support in the research literature (Sherif and 
Hovland, 1961). From this literature has come four theories which at-
tempt to account for social judgment phenomena. The theories are per-
ceptual vigilance, assimilation-contrast, variable series, and adapta-
tion level. Each theory predicts variation in judgment as a function 
of the judge's own attitude, but each deals with a somewhat different 
set of parameters. 
Perceptual vigilance, suggested by Hovland and Sherif (1952) is 
the least complex of the four theories. It holds that a judge who pos-
seses an extreme position in the attitude domain of the opinion state-
ments will tend to judge those statements with which he agrees as lying 
at his end of the scale, and all statements with which he disagrees as 
lying at the opposite and of the scale. Thus the statements are per-
ceived by the judge as being in basically two categories, accepted 
statements comprising one category at the judge's end of the scale and 
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rejected statements being lumped into the other category at the other 
end of the scale. According to this theory then, item discriminations 
are of a qualitative nature depending only on whether the judge agrees 
or disagrees with a statement and not particularly on its actual posi-
tion within the attitude domain. A problem with this theory is that it 
is only applicable in the case of extreme judges and does not allow for 
neutrality. For this reason, perceptual vigilance has found little use 
in studies of social judgment. 
Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif (1957) later elaborated on the percep-
tual vigilance hypothesis to arrive at a model of assimilation-contrast. 
This is a duo-process theory which maintains that the judge will per-
ceive statements which he would accept as being nearer to his own posi-
tion than they actually are (assimilation), and those statements which 
the judge would personally reject are judged as being farther from his 
position than they actually are (contrast). Hence, the judge's own 
attitude serves as an anchor for his scale of judgment. Statements 
which fall on the attitude scale near the judge's own position are per-
ceived to be nearer to that position than their actual scale value due 
to the assimilation of those items toward the judge's position. State-
ments which are not acceptable to the judge are perceived to be farther 
from his position than they actually are and the judgments of these 
items will tend to shift away from the judge's position toward the 
opposite end of the scale due to contrast effects. 
Research dealing with the theory of assimilation-contrast in socia1 
judgment has provided contradictory findings. For example, some studies 
have found both assimilation and contrast effects (Hovland, Harvey, and 
Sherif, 1957; Manis, 1960; and Prothro, 1957) while others have found 
assimilation but not contrast (Dillehay, 1965; Mani s , 1961; and Weiss , 
1959) . There are problems with the assimilation-~ontrast theory other 
than the inconsistencies in the research findings. One such problem is 
that this theory does not explicitly provide for an interaction between 
item judgment and characteristics of the item series such as that found 
by Upshaw (1962). That is, assimilation-contrast predicts that as long 
as the position of the judge relative to ~he attitude domain represented 
in the item series is constant the judgments of the individual items 
should not change. Upshaw however, demonstrated that this is not the 
case . When the range of attitudes represented by the item series was 
varied, the judgments of the items also varied. Thus, when the atti-
tudes expressed by statements surrounding a particular item changed, the 
judgment of that particular item also changed. To explain this occur-
rence, the variable series model was applied by Upshaw. 
The variable series theory, as suggested by Volkmann (1951), ex-
pressly provides for the interaction between judge's own position and 
the characteristics of the item series. Specifically, this model main-
tains that social judgment is a function of the judge's attitude rela-
tive to the range of attitudes expressed in the item series. If the own 
attitude of the judge lies outside of the range of attitudes represented 
in the item series the judge will use his own position as the anchor at 
one end of the scale and the statement farthest from his position will 
serve as the anchor at the other end. This situation results in wide 
categories and increased variability in judgments. If the judge's own 
position lies within the range of attitudes expressed the extreme state-
ments become the anchors, and the item discriminations tend to be more 
sensitive which results in a narrowing of category boundaries. Thus, 
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this theory accomm:dates an interaction such as that found by Upshaw 
(1962). It may be seen that the nature of the attitude domain repre-
sented in the item series is not one of the important variables of this 
theory since the judgment of the statements is attributed to the rela-
tionship between the judge's own position and the range of attitudes 
expressed in the series. Therefore, it should be expected that substi-
tution of different attitude domains into the item series would not 
affect the scale placements of the items as long as the relationship 
between the judge's position and the range of attitudes in the series 
remained unchanged. 
This expectation, however, may be unwarranted since perception of 
statements representing a given attitude domain, quite conceivably, re-
lies on certain classes of stimuli in addition to the judge's own posi-
tion within that attitude domain. One such class is derived from the 
status of the particular attitude domain within the social context 
within which the individual operates. That is, the collective attitudes 
of the dominant social groups in the population toward a given domain 
can be considered as forming a distribution along a continuum of social 
status. The mean of this distribution takes on the characteristics of 
a social norm that reflects a representative position of the social 
structure within which the individual operates. It is suggested that 
this average attitude or collective social norm serves as an external 
referent for the scale of judgment. This external referent may be per-
ceived differently by individual subjects due to differences in experi-
entially generated social perspectives, but it is assumed that the 
variability of the perceptions of the referent will be less than the 
variability among individual own attitudes and also that most subjects 
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could, if asked, judge the difference between their own position and 
the external one. Hence, the referent is psychologically present also 
there is no reason to believe that it is not independent of the sub-
ject's own attitude. Therefore, since different attitude domains may 
be perceived as occupying different positions on the scale of social 
status it should not be expected that judgments of different attitude 
domains will be similar simply because th~ judge's position within them 
is similar, particularly when the judge is instructed to disregard his 
own attitude . 
A fourth model, adaptation level (AL), takes these external refer-
ents into account. In fact, AL is the only one of the four theories 
that takes into formal consideration more than two classes of variables. 
The concept of AL, as developed by Helson (1948), deals with judgment 
as a function of the pooling of stimulation from a number of sources. 
These sources of stimulation interact with one another to establish an 
adaptation level or point of subjective neutrality. This point of sub-
jective neutrality or AL is that stimulus in the series which is per-
ceived by the judge to have neither more nor less of the attribute under 
consideration and serves as a reference point around which all other 
judgments are made . Although the number of parameters involved in the 
establishment of the neutral point is not fixed within the AL framework, 
three major classes of variables are most frequently considered. Ex-
tending AL theory to include social judgment data, the first class of 
variable contributing to the determination of the AL is the judge's own 
attitude toward the attitude domain under consideration. This own atti-
tude serves as a background variable against which the opinion state-
ments are evaluated. These statements constitute the second class of 
6 
variables in the AL system and also serve as the focal stimuli in the 
judgment task. The third major class of variables is that of residual 
factors. In social judgment, the most important constituent of these 
residual factors is the collective social norm discussed previously 
which defines the general position of a particular attitude domain 
within the society, and which acts as an external referent in determin-
ing the origin of a scale of judgment. The judge's contact with this 
collective social norm may be either direct through family and associ-
ates, indirect thro:ugh the various news media, or both. Whatever the 
case, it is contended by AL theory that the judge can discriminate 
between his own position regarding the attitude domain and the position 
of society regarding that domain, and that these two factors, in con-
junction with the characteristics of the item series, contribute to the 
formation of an origin for the scale of judgment. 
The dynamics of AL theory are not unduly complex. Since the AL is 
empirically defined as the stimulus value which evokes a neutral res-
ponse, that stimulus will be judged to occupy the mid-point of the 
measurement scale and it serves as the reference point for all judg-
ments. If the AL should locate at the upper end of the stimulus series, 
a greater number of stimuli will be perceived as being of lower value 
than the neutral stimulus and thus a greater number of stimuli will be 
placed on the measurement scale below its mid-point. If the AL should 
occur at the lower end of the stimulus series, the reverse would take 
place and a greater number of stimuli will be judged above the mid-point 
of the scale. Thus it can be seen that there is an inverse relationship 
between the position of the AL and the mean judgment of the stimulus 
series. 
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A rapid summary of the above reveals three basic approaches to 
social judgment: the judge-centered approach of perceptual vigilance 
and assimilation-contrast which considers the own attitude of the judge 
relative to the scale position of each item to be the most important 
factor ; the judge x item range approach of variable series which con-
centrates on the position of the judge relative to the range of atti-
tudes expressed in the item series; and the judge x item series x resid-
ual factors approach of adaptation level which encompasses the attitude 
of the j udge , the subject matter of the item series, and the collective 
social norm which defines the judge 1 s externalized, nonseries referent . 
As AL theory is the most complete of the four theories presented, it 
will be used in this study as the primary explanatory model. 
These four theoretical models frequently lead to the same predic-
tions, however under certain conditions they generate different pre-
di ctions (Upshaw, 1962). For instance, perceptual vigilance, 
assi milation-contrast , and variable series would all predict that as 
long as j udgmental conditions such as own attitude of the judge toward 
the social group he is judging, the affective content of the stimulus 
items, and the range of attitudes presented in the item series were 
held constant, substitution of different social group referents would 
not influence the judgment of the stimulus items. However , AL theory 
would predict that statements referring to different social groups 
would not be judged the same even though the judgmental conditions of 
own attitude and item content were identical . -This prediction is based 
on the differences in the collective social norms whi ch are associated 
with all social groups and which serve as external referents for the 
scale of judgment. The higher the normative status of a group , the 
higher the AL of a judge will be toward statements representing that 
group. Hence, there will be a greater number of items which are per-
ceived to be an unfavorable representation of that group and assigned 
8 
to the lower end of the judgment scale. Judgments of a social group of 
lower status would be made relative to a low AL and thus fewer items 
woul d be perceived as unfavorable while a greater number of items would 
be judged to be favorable toward that group. Therefore, holding the 
composition of the item series and the subjects own attitude position 
constant, it should be expected that movement of the AL to the upper end 
of the scale, as would be found in judgments of a high status social 
group, will yield an increasing number of judgments located at the nega-
tive end of the scale when compared with judgments made in reference to 
a low AL associated with a group of less social esteem. The results of 
this condition should indicate a lower mean item judgment of the high 
status group than the low status group. 
This prediction of adaptation level, however, should be considered 
in the light of the judgment set. According to Torgerson (1960), in a 
judgment situation 11 ••• the task set for the subject is to evaluate the 
stimuli with respect to some designated attribute ••• • Since the sub-
ject responds to the stimuli on the basis of its relative position 
among other stimuli, the effect of his own bias is minimized" (P . 48) . 
Torgerson continues with a definition of an endorsement set as one in 
which 11 •• • the subject is to respond to a stimulus on the basis of the 
position of the stimulus in relation to the subject's own position with 
respect to the attribute" (P. 48). Judgment set then, may be thought 
of as defining a continuum with complete freedom from bias at one end 
to completely subjective evaluation at the other. 
9 
The importance of judgment set for AL theory lies in its influence 
on the relative contribution of the three classes of variables. Under 
a strong judgment set the characteristics of the item series would 
carry the most weight in determining the placement of the items. Under 
an endorsement set the own attitudes class of variables carries the 
maximum value. At some intermediate point between a complete judgment 
set and a complete endorsement set residual factors (collective norms) 
will carry a maximum, but not necessarily dominant, value. Thus, it 
should be expected that ratings of items will be less discrepant when 
judgment of item content is highly stressed than when it is not due to 
the reduced influence of own attitudes and residual factors. 
The purpose of this research is to test the applicability of AL 
theory to social judgment by simulating the condition delineated earlier 
in which three attitude domains are represented in opinion statements 
of identical affective content, and which are judged by subjects having 
equal positions within the domain they judge. In order to carry this 
out, it was necessary to ~elP-ct at least three social groups which 
could be ordered as to position on a scale of social status. The groups 
selected for this purpose were the Negroes, the Jews, and the Irish. 
The Negroes , with little doubt, occupied the lowest social position of 
the three groups. The social positions of the Jews and Irish were some-
what less clear-cut, but it was felt that the Irish held the highest 
social status with the position of the Jews falling somewhere in 
between. Manipulation of the judgment set was accomplished through the 
instructions. One set of instructions emphasized judgment of i tem con-
tent while another did not. Judges who were reasonably equal in atti-
tudes toward the group they judged were selected, and opinion statements 
representing the three social groups in items equal in affective con-
tent completed the simulation. 
The hypotheses deduced from AL theory were: 
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1. The attitude statements representing the Negro will be 
assigned the highest mean judgment of the three social groups followed 
by the Jews and Irish in that order. 
2. The differences between the mean judgments of the three social 
groups will be less under instructions which stress judgment of item 
content than under instructions which do not. More specifically, it is 
hypothesized that there will be a significant interaction between social 
groups and judgment set. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
The social groups tepresented in the stimulus items were selected 
intuitively. The opinion items employed were selected from the set of 
114 statements constructed by Hinckley (1932) and scaled in equal ap-
pearing interval scale values in a recent study by Upshaw (1962). Since 
many of these items were inappropriate for the design of this study, two 
criteria of selection were employed. The first of these required each 
item to be such that the word Negro, Jew, or Irish could be used inter-
changeably without loss of credibility. The second criterion was that 
the final group of items selected must cover the entire range of cate-
gories based on Upshaw's (1962) scale values determined from his control 
condition (i.e. subjects who judged the entire group of 114 statements). 
Forty items were selected on the basis of these two criteria. It was 
assumed that by inserting different reference groups names the affective 
content of the items remained unchanged. In a few cases it was neces-
sary to rewrite an item, but the changes made were modest and the rela-
tive position of the item within the series should not have been alter-
ed noticeably (Appendix A). 
Each set of forty statements was presented in random order in a 
booklet. Under each statement was a scale from 1 to 11 in arabic numer-
als without adjectival anchors. The randomization procedure consisted 
of arranging each of the three sets of forty statements into two forms. 
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For one form, each complete set of items was randomly assigned to posi-
tions in five pages with eight items on each page and these pages were 
then reproduced. The pages were next assembled into booklets with the 
order of pages randomly determined for each subject. For the second 
form, this procedure was repeated with a new randomization of the set of 
items. Thus, there were 240 different orders of presentation for each 
set of items, and, since this procedure was performed with each set, 
there were 720 different orders of presentation for the entire collec-
tion of 120 statements. 
Each booklet of judgment items was accompanied by one or the other 
of the two instructional conditions used to establish the two levels of 
set involved in the study. One set of instructions placed emphasis on 
the necessity of maintaining a judgement set. 
The purpose of this study is to construct a scale for 
measuring attitudes toward the On the pages that 
follow you will find a series of statements that express 
opinions about the social position of the~~· Beneath 
each statement you will find a scale of eleven categories, 
and your task is to assign each statement to the category 
which best indicates the level of social position expres-
sed by the statement. Whether you agree or disagree with 
a statement should not enter into your judgments. You are 
only to judge the social position of the that is ex-
pressed by each statement, and not the extent that you 
would be willing to endorse the opinion expressed. 
_Catego:ry 1 will contain those statements which place 
the in the lowest social position, and Category 11 
will contain those statements that place the in the 
highest social position. In like manner, the categories 
labeled 2, J, 4, etc. refer to statements that give the 
higher and higher social position. 
Read each statement, then draw a circle around the 
category number that you judge to best represent the level 
of social position expressed by the statement. Hence, at 
the completion of the task you will have, in a sense, 
arranged all the opinions in eleven steps of the social 
ladder that is represented by the scale. 
Do not try to assign the same number of statements 
to each category. Use your O'iln judgment as to the posi-
tion of each statement, and do not be concerned with the 
number of times you assign statements to any one category. 
Please try to bear in mind at all times that you are to 
judge only the content of each statement. Whether you agree or 
disagree with a statement should not enter into your jud.@lents. 
You are only to judge the social position of the that is 
expressed by a statement, and not the extent that you are will-
ing to endorse the opinion expressed. 
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The other instructions were similar to those employed by Upshaw (1962). 
This set mentioned item content but did not emphasize it. 
The purpose of this study is to construct a scale for 
measuring attitudes toward the On the pages that 
follow you will find a series of statements that express 
opinions about the social position of the~~· Beneath 
each statement you will find a scale of eleven categories,. 
and your task is to assign each statement to the category 
which best indicates the level of social position, and 
Cateogry 11 will contain those statements that place the 
in the highest social position. In like manner, the 
categories labeled 2, J, 4. etc. refer to statements that 
give the higher and higher social position. 
Read each statement, then draw a circle around the 
category number which you judge to best represent the 
level of social position expressed by the statement. 
Hence, at the completion of the task you will have, in a 
sense, arranged all of the opinions in eleven steps on the 
social ladder that is represented by the scale. 
Do not try to assign the same number of statements to 
each category. Use your own judgment as to the position 
of each statement, and do not be concerned about the num-
ber of times you assign statements to any one category. 
In addition to the statements to be judged were two scales de-
signed to measure the subject 1s own-attitude toward the group he was 
judging. The first of these two measures consisted of ten items selec-
ted from the Hinckley series on the basis of the same criteria used in 
selecting the judgment items. The items were ordered on the page with 
the most positive statement at the top to the most negative statement 
at the bottom, and the subjectVs task was to select the one item from 
the group of ten that most closely resembled his own attitude toward 
the group represented. The group represented was in every case the 
group the subject encountered in the judgment series. The second 
measure of own-attitude was derived from the E scale. ·rhe E scale is a 
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measure of ethnocentrism which is defined as the tendency to be rig1d in 
the acceptance of the culturally "like" and in the rejection of the 
culturally "unlike" (Adorno et al., 1950). The suggested final form of 
the E scale used in this study (Appendix B) consists of 20 statements 
which are endorsed on a six category Likert scale with categories ex-
tending from strong agreement to strong disagreement. The items all re-
flect negative attitudes and are scored such that strong agreement re-
ceives a score of six and strong disagreement receives a score of zero. 
Thus, a total ~'core of 60 indicates a transition from an average ten-
dency to accept cultural differences to one of rejection of these dif-
ferences. 
Subjects : the subjects were selected from 729 volunteers from 
basic psychology olasses at Oklahoma State University. Since one of 
the controls of this study required that judges be equated on the basis 
of own-attitudes, the selection of subjects was based on their scores 
on the two endorsement scales. Uniformity of positive own-attitudes 
toward the group judged was accomplished by selecting only those sub-
jects who had marked one of the three most positive statements in the 
self-selection task. To reinforce this criterion and better ensure that 
the subjects were properly equated in terms of own-attitude, only those 
who scored 50 or less on the E scale were retained for the final analy-
sis . It was felt that this procedure ensured reasonable equality of 
attitudes not only within groups but also across groups. A carelessness 
criterion was employed in order to reduce error variation. This criter-
ion consisted of re j ecting subjects who placed statements scaled at one 
extreme into categories at the opposite extreme six or more times. In 
this case, the extremes were defined as categories 1, 2, and 3 at the 
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low end of the scale, and categories 9, 10, and 11 at the high end. 
Thus, a subject who placed a statement which had a scale value of J into 
category 9 six or more times was rejected on the basis of carelessness. 
Twelve subjects were eliminated by this criterion. 
At the completion of the selection process, 236 subjects remained. 
Of those who judged the items under the instructions which stressed 
item content (high judgment set). there were 40 subjects who had judged 
the Negro items, 43 who had judged the Jewish items, and 39 who had 
judged the Irish items. Of those making judgments under instructions 
which did not stress item content (low judgment set), 36 had judged 
the Negro items, JS the Jewish items, and 40 the Irish items. 
Procedure: The subjects judged the stimulus items in groups of 
between 5 and 50 subjects each. Each group was assigned a treatment 
combination in an unsystematic manner. Since the major dependent vari-
able of this study was the item judgments, the judgment task was always 
presented first to keep it free of any influence from the endorsement 
task. After the subjects had entered the experimental room, the book-
lets of judgment items were distributed and the instructions read aloud 
by the experimenter while the subjects followed on their copies. At the 
completion of the judgment task, the endorsement scales were distri-
buted. First the instructions for the self-selection task were read 
aloud and, that task finished, the instructions for the E scale were 
read and that task completed. At this point, the subjects were dismiss-
ed and the booklet of judgment items for each subject was clipped to 
its corresponding endorsement scales. After each group had gone through 
this procedure. the endorsement scales were scored and the subjects 
were selected according to the procedure outlined above. 
CHAPI'ER III 
RESULTS 
The dependent variable analyzed in this experiment was mean scale 
placement. Separate means were computed for the 13 most positive state-
ments, the 14 mid-scale statements, and the 13 most negative state-
ments, thus there were three measures from each subject. An analysis 
of variance was performed on the data which was organized in a 
3 x 2 x 3 factorial arrangement of treatments with repeated measures on 
the third factor. The factors were social groups (Negroes, Jews, and 
Irish), judgment set (high and low), and item position (negative, mid-
scale, and positive) respectively. The mean scale placements of the 
items under each treatment combination are presented in Table I, and 
the means associated with the three sets of main effects are presented 
in Table II. Due to unplanned unequal group size, an unweighted means 
solution (Winer, 1962) was employed to yield the analysis of variance 
presented in Table III. This is not a least squares solution, but 
should in this instance yield a reasonably close approximation to a 
least squares solution. 
The results of the analysis of variance indicates that the effect 
of varying social groups in the item series was significant at the .01 
level. The positions of the mean judgments of the social groups were 
in the expected order, the Negro statements highest, Jews next, and 
Irish lowest. Individual comparisons of the means showed all the 
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Low 
Judgment 
Set 
High 
Judgment 
Set 
TABLE I 
Jv1EAN SCALE PLACElIBI'HS OF ATTITUDE STATEl1 ENTS UNDJ~R 
BACH TREATEENT C01V.J3IiiJAI'ION 
i\Jegro Statements Jew Statements Irish Statements 
Neg Hid Pas Neg Nid Pas Neg ' lftd Pas 
2.821 5.665 9.038 2.453 4.695 9.111 2.292 4.300 8.633 
2.598 5.167 8 • .540 2. JLJ.5 4.666 8.667 2.430 4.393 7.842 
I-' 
-,J 
TABLE II 
MAIN EFFECTS OF TREA:l'MENTS ON MEAN SCALE PLACEMENTS 
"()F ATTITUDE STATEMENTS 
Social Groups (A) Judgment Set (B). Item Position (C) 
Negro Jew Irish Low High_. Neg· Mid-scale Pos 
5.638 5.323 . 4.982 5.445 5.183 2.490. 4.810 8.636 
! 
l 
~ 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MEAN SCALE PLACEMENTS 
OF ATTITUDE STATEMENTS 
Degrees 
of Mean 
Source of Variation Freedom Square 
Between Subjects 235 
Social Groups (A) 2 25.372 
Judgment Set (B) 1 12.157 
G:roups x Set (AB) 2 .901 
Subjects within groups 230 1.826 
Within Subjects 472 
Item Position (C) 2 2267.998 
Groups x Items (AC) 4 5.314 
Set x Items (BC) 2 4.490 
Groups x Set x Items (ABC) 4 .382 
C x subjects within groups 460 .992 
**.01 
*.05 
19 
F 
13.894** 
6.658* 
2286.288** 
5.317** 
4.526* 
20 
differences to be significant at the .01 level. Manipulation of the 
judgment set was significant at the .05 level with the mean judgments 
under the high judgment condition lower than the mean judgments under 
the low judgment set. The variance due to item position, as would be 
expected, was significant well beyond the .01 level, the negative items 
lowest and the positive items highest. The expected interaction between 
social groups and judgment set did not occur. The interaction between 
social groups and item position (Fig. 1) was significant at the .01 
level, and the interaction between item position and judgment set (Fig. 
2) was significant at the .05 level. The higher order interaction be-
tween the three treatments was not significant. 
Analysis of the simple effects (Winer, 1962) in the social groups 
and item position interaction revealed that the mean scale position of 
the negative statements referring to the Negroes was significantly 
higher (F = 4.802; F. 99(1,460) = J.84) than the mean scale position of 
the same statements referring to the Jews and Irish which were not 
significantly different from each other (F = .056). The mean scale 
position of the mid-scale items were found to be significantly differ-
ent for all social groups. The mid-scale items referring to the Negroes 
were higher than those referring to Jews (F = 21.50), and the mid-scale 
items referring to the Jews were higher than those referring to the 
Irish (F = 4.444). The mean scale position of the positive statements 
referring to the Negroes was not significantly different from that of 
the same statements referring to the Jews (F = .396), but the mean 
scale positions of items referring to both of these groups were signi-
ficantly greater than the same statements referring to the Irish 
(F = 12.063 and F = 16.865 respectively). 
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Figure 1. 'rhe social groups x i tam position interaction of the 
mean scale placement of attitude statements 
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Analysis of the simple effects in the interaction between the judg-
ment set and item position showed that none of the differences between 
levels of judgment at the three levels of item position reached signi-
ficance at the .05 level. However, the differences increased in such a 
manner as to lead one to the belief that the significant interaction 
may have been due to the very small difference between mean scale posi-
tions of the negative items, and the relatively large difference between 
the mean scale positions of the positive items. An explanation of this 
occurrence will be undertaken in the discussion section. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The major hypothesis that the mean judgments of the three social 
groups would order themselves inversely to the social status of those 
groups was confirmed. This indicates that when something favorable was 
said about a social group of high social status (e.g. the Irish), it 
was not perceived as being as positive as was the same statement refer-
ring to a group of lower status (e.g. the Negro). Adaptation level 
theory explains this finding as being due to a higher point of subjec-
tive neutrality in judgments of the social group of high status which 
causes a greater number of stimulus items to be seen as unfavorable and 
thus placed at the low end of the response scale. For judgments of the 
low status group, the reverse occurs causing a greater number of state-
ments to be placed at the high end of the response scale. Thus it 
appears that the social status of a group as defined by a collective 
social norm was serving as an external referent in this experiment , and 
caused the perceptions of the items representing different social groups 
to be different. This finding tends to cast a shadow on the perceptual 
vigilance, assimilation-contrast, and variable series theories of social 
judgment which do not take into account factors that are external to the 
judge or item series. The results of this study also tend to discredit 
Remmers' contention that a generalized attitude scale can be built 
using statements into which any social group can be substituted. More 
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specifically, it was shown that even though two attitude statements 
representing different social groups are equal in affective content, 
they are not perceived as representing equal attitudes. Since these 
items would not be endorsed in the same manner a generalized attitude 
scale of the type suggested by Remmers would not be valid. Thus the 
demonstration that a collective social norm may serve as an external 
referent should be taken into consideration by subsequent research in 
the area of social judgment. 
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The second hypothesis, that manipulation of the judgment set would 
interact with the evaluation of the opinion statements, was not con-
firmed. Specifically, it was expected that the distance between the 
mean item placement of each group would be less under conditions which 
stressed judgment of content than under conditions which did not. Al-
though this occurred with the judgments of the mid-scale items, it did 
not occur with the judgments of the positive or negative statements. 
What did occur is that at the positive extreme the statements repre-
senting Negroes and Jews were rated equally high and items representing 
the Irish were rated significantly lower. At the negative extreme the 
position of the Negro and Irish statements maintained their relative 
positions but the position of the Jewish statements reversed to a point 
significantly lower than the Negro statements and equal to the Irish 
statements. It was this relationship that contributed to the unexpected 
interaction between the social groups and item position that was found. 
The reason this interaction was not expected is that AL theory predicts 
the entire scale to shift in a linear fashion with changes in the AL 
and not at the middle of the scale alone as suggested by these results, 
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However, the finding that the Irish and Negro statements retained 
their significantly large differences at both extremes and that the 
position of the Jewish statements reversed at the extremes, suggests 
that end effects may be the cause of the interaction. That is, as the 
judge's AL moved toward one extreme, the statements he judged to lie at 
the opposite extreme tended to pile up in the end categories there be-
cause the response scale did not have a sufficient range of categories 
to accomodate them. In other words, if a judge perceived a statement to 
be extremely negative he may assign it to the extreme category at that 
end, but when he encounters a statement which he believes to be even 
more negative than the first he is forced to assign those statements 
equal positions on the response continuum even though they occupy dif-
ferent positions in his judgment scale. This piling up of responses is 
what is referred to as an "end effect." 
If these end effects are in fact operating in this experiment it 
is a simple matter to explain the interaction between social groups and 
item position. The end effects at the negative extreme caused the mean 
judgments of the negative items representing the Irish to be spuriously 
high and thus equal to the mean judgments of those items referring to 
the Jews, but, since there was enough room at the positive extreme due 
to the relatively high AL of the Irish statements, the position of the 
positive statements fell in the expected order, the Irish lower than 
the Jews. The end effects at the positive extreme held the mean j udg-
ment of the positive statements representing the Negro down to a posi-
tion equal to that of the positive Jew statements, and, since there 
was ample room at the negative end due to the low AL of the Negro items, 
the expected relationship was again found, the Negroes being higher 
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than the Jews. Thus it is possible that the subject's entire scale of 
judgment underwent a linear transformation as predicted by AL theory, 
but due to end effects, uniform shifts of item placements were impossi-
ble resulting in the interaction between item position and social judg-
ment. 
A hypothesis other than end effects which might also account for 
the item position interaction found is that the end points are serving 
as anchors for the scale of judgment. This proposition however, gains 
little support from the findings of significant differences at the end 
points. That is, the end anchors hypothesis holds that, if the ends of 
the response scale had been serving as anchors, the significant differ-
ences in the mean judgments of the different social groups at those 
positions would not have occurred. An implication of the rejection of 
this hypothesis is that if the ends of the scale are not acting as 
anchors, one may be led to suspect that the greater distance found be-
tween the mean judgments of the mid-scale items was not due to their 
greater ambiquity as suggested by Edwards (1946), but was due to their 
greater freedom of movement on the response scale. 
Although the influence of the social groups on the item judgments 
was fairly clear, the significant effect of varying the instructions 
was not. In most cases, the placements of the items were lower under 
the high judgment set than under the low judgment set. An unpublished 
study by Rambo (1967) which employed essentially the same items and 
used identical instructions also found that increased stress on judg-
ment of item content lowered the mean scale placement of those items 
relative to the lower judgmental condition. An explantion of this oc-
currence is not readily available. The interaction between judgment set 
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and item position is also difficult to explain. The finding that none 
of the simple effects were significant in this interaction may suggest 
that a type one error has been made. That is, rejecting the null hypo-
thesis when it should not be. There is a remote possibility that end 
effects could have caused this interaction if it is real. 
A test of the end effects hypothesis could be performed by repli-
cating this study using an own-categories method of item judgment with 
a fixed mid-point. It would be expected, according to AL theory, that 
the total number of categories used for the judgment of each group 
would be equal, but the number of categories falling below the mid-
point of the judgment scale would be greatest for the Irish statements, 
next for the Jewish statements, and least for the Negro statements. 
Manipulation of the judgment set should then cause these differences to 
decrease. Since there are no restrictions on the extent of categories 
available, there should be no interactions between the items and the 
social groups or judgment set. 
In conclusion, the AL theory seems to fit the major findings of 
this study quite well as long as the assumption is made that end effects 
are operating, but until the proposed research is carried out and its 
hypotheses confirmed or denied, one may only speculate on the validity 
of this assumption. Further research is also necessary before an 
explanation of the judgment set phenomenon can be obtained. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of this study was to measure the influence of 
an external referent on judgments of attitude statements . The explana-
tory model used was Helson's adaptation level theory. This theory holds 
that judgments of attitude statements are a function of three classes of 
variables : the judgeVs own atti tude, the affective content of the in-
dividual items, and residual factors which, for this experiment, was 
considered to be an external 9 nonseries referent consisting of a col-
lective social norm defining the social status of the social group rep-
resented in the item series. Other theories of social judgment take 
into account the firs t two classes of variables mentioned, but do not 
take into f ormal consideration the third class, residual factors , The 
test of AL theory required the first two variables (judge Us own atti-
tude and item content) to be held constant and allow onl y the residual 
factor (col.lective social norm) to varyo 
Three social groups, the Negroes, Jews, and Irish, were selected 
to be represented in the attitude statements, These social groups were 
selected because they could be ordered along a scale of social status, 
Judge's own attitude was held constant by using only subjects who pos-
sessed a positive attitude toward the group they judged, Affective 
content of the itenIB was controlled by selecting the statements from 
the Hinckley series and inserting the appropriate social group. Thus 
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the items differed only in the social group they represented. 
The hypotheses deduced from AL theory were a) the mean judgment of 
the Negro statements would be highest followed by the Jew and Irish in 
that order; and b) the influence of the residual factors will decrease 
when judgment of item content is emphasized relative to its influence 
when judgment of content is not emphasized causing an interaction be-
tween social groups and judgment set. 
The results clearly supported the first hypothesis. The second 
hypothesis however, did not receive a strong confirmation since the 
expected interaction between social groups and judgment set did not 
occur. The manipulation of judgment set was found to have significant 
effects, but its explanation could not be drawn from the data present. 
A significant interaction between item position and social groups 
suggested that end effects may have been operating which caused the 
second hypothesis to be disconfirmed. 
It was concluded that the collective social norm associated with 
a social group does serve as an external referent f or judgments of 
attitude statements representing that group, and that this should be 
taken into account in further research in the area of social judgment . 
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APPENDIX A 
JUIXiMENT STATEMENTS 
1. The Negro should have freedom but never be treated on an equal 
basis with the white man. 
2. You cannot condemn all Negroes because of the beha:vior of some of 
them. 
J. I would welcome a Negro family moving into my neighborhood. 
4. The Negro is by no means fit for social equality with the most 
common white. 
5. It is possible for the Negro and white races to be brothers in 
faith without becoming brothers-in-law. 
6. The Negro should not be condemned forever to a lower place than 
the white man, but a different place. 
?. I see no reason why a Negro should not be allowed to marry a white 
person if both parties desire it. 
8. The Negro should be allowed to associate with the white man only 
in the necessary business relationships. 
9. The Negro should be given the same educational advantages as the 
white man. 
10. So great is the social range between the highly educated Negro and 
the 11nigger, 11 that the race as a whole cannot be assigned to any 
one notch in the social scale. 
11. The Negro should not be simply the doormat of American civiliza-
tion. 
12. Negroes should not be allowed to mingle with whites in any way. 
13. The Negro must possess a much deeper moral nature than the white 
man, since he has progressed in the face of far greater obstacles. 
14. Whether you welcome the existence of the educated and prosperous 
Negroes or not, they are here and must be given social recognition. 
15. The Negro should not be allowed to attend the same school as white 
children. 
16. The inability of the Negroes to develop outstanding leaders dooms 
them to a low place in society. 
35 
17. Nearly 40 years of devoted and enthusiastic effort to elevate and 
educate the Negro lie stretched out behind us in a dead level of 
failure. 
18. After you have educated the Negro to the level of the white man, 
there will still be an impassible gulf between them. 
19. I believe that the Negro is entitled to the same social privileges 
as the white man. 
20. The Negro should have the advantage of all social benefits of the 
white man but be limited to his own race in the practice thereof. 
21. Although handicapped by a slight intellectual inferiority, the 
Negro has gained a firmer hold on the higher spiritual realities 
than the white man. 
22. I would be willing to tolerate contact with the black man so long 
as there is no attempt at, or suggestion of, equality. 
23. Give the Negro a high position in society and he will show himself 
equal to it. 
24. I would not patronize a hotel that accomodates Negroes. 
25. The Negro, a human being in every sense of the word, should be 
given equality of rating with the other races. 
26. I think of the colored race as occupying a somewhat lower position 
socially than the white races. 
27. No Negro should hold an office of trust, honor, or profit. 
28. Inherently, the Negro and the white man are equal. 
29. There are some Negroes with whom I would esteem it a privilege to 
travel, but I would not spend an hour with most members of the 
Negro race. 
30. In this day of rush and hurry, the Negro has met the problems of 
society in a much calmer manner than the white man. 
31. The Negro is perfectly capable of taking care of himself, if the 
white man would only let him alone. 
32. The Negro and the white man should be given the same privileges, 
but separated in the enjoyment of these privileges. 
33. Our judgments of social level are based on economic standing, and 
the Negroes are farther down in the scale than any other group. 
34. The Negro is fully capable of social equality with the white man, 
but he should not be so recognized until he is better trained. 
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35. I think the Negros should make up a rather clearly defined working 
class in America. 
36. In a thousand years the Negro might become the equal of the white 
man, then his social position should be equal. 
37. As long as the Negro continues his struggle to overcome ignorance 
and sin, we should assist by giving him every privilege, as far 
as possible, which we ourselves enjoy. 
38. The Negro has clearly shown his inferiority and whites should con-
tinue to exercise their power of leadership over him. 
39. About ten percent of the Negroes in the United States have traits 
which would place them on a level with the average white man. 
40. No person with the slightest trace of Negro blood should associate 
with whites. 
41. I see no reason why a Jew should not marry a white person if both 
parties desire it. 
42. Our judgments of social level are based on economic standing, and 
the Jews are farther down in the scale than any other group. 
43. I would be willing to tolerate contact with the Jew so long as 
there is no attempt at , or suggestion of, equality. 
44. The Jew should not be allowed to attend the same school as gentile 
children. 
45. The Jew must possess a much deeper moral nature than the gentile, 
since he has progressed in the face of far greater obstacles. 
46. The Jew should not be condemned forever to a lower place than the 
gentile, but a different place. 
47. The Jew should have the advantage of all social benefits of the 
gentile but be limited to his own group in the practice thereof. 
48. The Jew should have freedom but never be treated on an equal basis 
with the gentile. 
49. Nearly 40 years of devoted and enthusiastic effort to elevate and 
educate the Jew lie stretched out behind us in a dead level of 
failure. 
50. As long as the Jew continues his struggle to overcome ignorance 
and sin, we should assist by giving him every privilege, as far 
as possible, which we ourselves enjoy. 
51. The Jew is by no means fit for social equality with the most 
common gentile. 
52. I believe that the Jew is entitled to the same social privileges 
as the gentile. 
53. I would welcome a Jewish family moving into my neighborhood. 
54. So great is the social range between the highly educated Jew and 
the 11kike, 11 that the group as a whole cannot be assigned to any 
one notch in the social scale. 
55. Give the Jew a high position in society and he will show himself 
equal to it. 
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56. Although handicapped by a slight intellectual inferiority, the Jew 
has gained a firmer hold on the higher spiritual realities than 
the gentile. 
57. Whether you welcome the existence of educated and prosperous Jews 
or not, they are here and must be given social recognition. 
58. Jews should not be allowed to mingle with gentiles in any way. 
59. The Jew and the gentile should be given the same privileges, but 
separated in the enjoyment of these privileges. 
60. I think the Jews should make up a rather clearly defined working 
class in America. 
61. The Jew, a human being in every sense of the word, should be given 
equality of rating with the other groups. 
62. About ten percent of the Jews in the United States have traits 
which would place them on a level with the average gentile. 
63. In this day of rush and hurry, the Jew has met the problems of 
society in a much calmer manner than the gentile. 
64. No Jew should be allowed to hold an office of trust, honor, or 
profit. 
65. The Jew should be given the same educational advantages as the 
gentile. 
66. There are some Jews with whom I would esteem it a privilege to 
travel, but I would not spend an hour with most members of the 
Jewish group. 
67. The Jew is perfectly capable of taking care of himself, if the 
gentile would only let him alone. 
68. The Jew should be allowed to associate with the gentile only in 
the necessary business relati onships. 
69. You cannot condemn all Jews because of the behavior of some of 
them. 
38 
70. The J·ew is fully capable of social equality with the gentile, but 
he should not be so recognized until he is better trained. 
71. Inherently, the Jew and the gentile are equal. 
72. The Jew should not be simply the doormat of American civilization. 
73. After you have educated the Jew to the level of the gentile, there 
will still be an impassible gulf between them. 
74. I think of the Jewish as occupying a somewhat lower position 
socially than the gentile. 
75. It is possible for the Jews and gentiles to be brothers in faith 
without becoming brothers-in-law. 
76. No person with the slightest trace of Jewish blood should asso-
ciate with gentiles. 
77. The inability of the Jews to develop outstanding leaders dooms 
them to a low place in society. 
78. The Jew has clearly shown his inferiority and gentiles should con-
tinue to exercise their power of leadership over him. 
79. In a thousand years the Jew might become the equal of the gentile, 
then his social position should be equal. 
80. I would not patronize a hotel that accomodates Jews. 
81. In this day of rush and hurry, the Irishman has met the problems 
of society in a much calmer manner than other people. 
82. Whether you welcome the existence of educated and prosperous 
Irishmen or not, they are here and must be given social recogni-
tion. 
83. No Irishman should hold an office of trust, honor, or profit. 
84. The Irish should not be allowed to attend the same school as 
other children. 
85. The Irish should be allowed to associate with other groups only 
in the necessary business relationships. 
86. I would be willing to tolerate contact with the Irish so long as 
there is no attempt at, or suggestion of, equality. 
87. The Irishman must possess a much deeper moral nature than other 
people, since he has progrssed in the face of far greater ob-
stacles. 
88. In a thousand years the Irishman might become the equal of other 
people, then his social position should be equal. 
89. The inability of the Irish to develop outstanding leaders dooms 
them to a low place in society. 
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90. The Irishman should not be simply the doormat of American civili.z-
ation. 
91. The Irish are by no means fit for social equality with the most 
connnon members of other nationality groups. 
92. No person with the slightest trace of Irish blood should associate 
with other groups. 
93. The Irish should .have freedom but never be treated on an equal 
basis with other groups. 
94. The Irish should be given the same educational advantages as 
other peole. 
95. You cannot condemn all Irishmen because of the behavior of some 
of them. 
96. I would not patronize a hotel that accomodates the Irish. 
97. The Irishman should not be simply the doormat of American civiliza-
tion. 
98. The Irishman has clearly shown his inferiority and other groups 
should continue to exercise their power of leadership over him. 
99. Inherently, the Irish and other nationality groups are equal. 
lCXl. Whether you welcome the existence of educated and prosperous 
Irishmen or not, they are here and must be given social recogni-
tion. 
101. No person with the slightest trace of Irish blood should associate 
with other groups. 
102 In a thousand years the Irishman might become the equal of other 
people, then his social position should be equal. 
103. After yQu have educated the Irishman to the level of other people, 
there will still be an impassible gulf between them. 
104. No Irishman should hold an office of trust, honor, or profit. 
10~ The Irishman is perfectly capable of taking care of himself, if 
other people would only let him alone. 
10~ After you have educated the Irishman to the level of other people, 
there will still be an impassible gulf between them. 
107. Irishmen should not be allowed to mingle with other people in any 
way. 
108. It is possible for the Irish and other people to be brothers in 
faith without becoming brothers-in-law. 
109. The Irish and other people should be given the same privileges, 
but separated in the enjoyment of these privileges. 
110. I would welcome an Irish family moving into r.rry neighborhood. 
111. The Irish should not be condemned forever to a lower place than 
other people, but to a different place. 
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112. I see no reason why an Irishman should not be allowed to marry a 
person of another group if both parties desire it. 
113. I think of the Irish as occupying a somewhat lower position 
socially than other nationality groups. 
114. Inherently, the Irish and other nationality groups are equal. 
115. The Irish should have the advantage of all social benefits of 
other people, but be limited to his own group in the practice 
thereof. 
116. Although handicapped by a slight intellectual inferiority, the 
Irishman has gained a firmer hold on the higher spiritual reali-
ties than other people. 
117. The Irishman is fully capable of social equality with other 
people, but he should not be so recognized until he is better 
trained. 
118. There are some Irishmen with whom I would esteem it a privilege 
to travel, but I would not spend an hour with most members of the 
Irish group. 
119. The Irishman, a human being in every sense of the word, should be 
given equality of rating with the other groups, 
120. The Irishman has clearly shown his inferiority and other groups 
should continue to exer.cise their power of leadership over him. 
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APPENDIX B 
ENDORSEMENT SCALES 
The following 10 statements represent attitudes toward ~the Negroes. 
The items are arranged in order from most favorable at the top to most 
unfavorable at the bottom. Put an X in the space beside the one state-
ment that most closely represents your own attitude toward the Negroes. 
Mark only one statement. 
The record of the Negro in the recent war places him on a level 
with any United States citizen. 
Our refusal to acceptal the Negro is not based on any fact in 
nature but rather on prejudice, and should be overcome. 
In all my dealings with the Negro, he has been agreeable and 
courteous. 
The rich spiritual life of the Negro compensates adequately for 
the defects in his nature. 
People tend to exaggerate the differences between the Negroes 
and whites. 
The difference between the Negroes and whites is not one of mere 
degree, but of kind. 
In all social affairs implying equality, the Negroes and whites 
must be kept apart. 
The social place of the Negro is slightly below that of the 
illiterate white man. 
The Negro should be considered in the lowest class of society 
among human beings. 
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The following 10 statements represent attitudes toward the Irish, The 
items are arranged in order from most favorable at the top to most 
unfavorabl~ at the bottom, Put an X in the space beside the one state-
ment that most closely represents your own attitude toward the Irish, 
Mark only one statement. 
The record of the Irishman in the recent war places him on a level 
with any United States citizen. 
Our refusal to accept the Irish is not based on any fact in nature 
but rather on prejudice, and should be overcome. 
In all my dealings with the Irishman, he has been agreeable and 
courteous, 
The rich spiritual life of the Irishman compensates adequately 
for the defects in his nature. 
People tend to exaggerate the differences between the Irish and 
other groups. 
I am not at all interested in how the Irish rate socially. 
The difference between the Irish and other people is not one of 
mere degree, but of kind. 
In all social affairs implying equality, the Irish and other 
people must be kept apart. 
The social place of the Irishman is lightly below the illiterate 
of other nationality groups. 
The Irish should be considered in the lowest class of society 
among human beings. 
The following 10 statements represent attitudes toward the Jews. The 
items are arranged in order from most favorable at the top to'inost un-
favorable at the bottom. Put an X in the space beside the one statement 
that most closely represents your-own attitude toward the Jews. Mark 
only one statement. 
The record of the Jew in the recent war places him on a level with 
any United States citizen. 
Our refusal to accept the Jew is not based on any fact in nature 
but rather on prejudice, and should be overcome. 
In all my dealings with the Jew, he has been agreeable and 
courteous. 
The rich spiritual life of the Jew compensates adequately for the 
defects in his nature. 
People tend to exaggerate the differences between the Jews and 
gentiles. 
I am not at all interested in how the Jews rate socially. 
The difference between the Jews and gentiles is not one of mere 
degree, but of kind. 
In all social affairs implying equality, the Jews and gentiles 
must be kept apart. 
The social place of the Jews is slightly below that of the 
illiterate gentile. 
The Jew should be considered in the lowest class of society 
among human beings. 
S T O P 
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The following statements refer to opinions regarding a nmnber of social 
groups and issues, about which some people agree and others disagree. 
Please mark each statement in the left-hand margin according to your 
agreement or disagreement, as follows: 
+l: slight support, agreement -1: slight opposition, disagreement 
+2: moderate support, agreement -2: moderate opposition, disagreement 
+3: strong support, agreement -3: strong opposition, disagreement 
1. I can hardly imagine myself marrying a Jew. 
2. Now that a new world organization is set up, America must be 
sure that she loses none of her independence and complete 
power as a sovereign nation. 
3. It would be a mistake ever to have Negroes for foremen and 
l eaders over whit es. 
4. One trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they stick to-
gether and prevent other people from having a fair chance in 
competition. 
5. It i s only natural and right for each person to think that 
his family is better than any other. 
6. Most Negroes would become overbearing and disagreeable if not 
kept in their place. 
?. The best guarantee of our national security is for America 
to have the biggest army and navy in the world and the secret 
of the Atom bomb. 
8. The trouble with letting Jews into a nice neighborhood is 
that they gradually give it a typical Jewish atmosphere. 
9. To end prejudice against the Jews, the first step is for the 
Jews to try sincerely to get rid of their harmful and irri-
tating faults. 
10. Manual labor and unskilled jobs seem to fit the Negro menta-
lity and ability better than more skilled or responsible 
work. 
11. The worst danger to real Americanism during the last 50 years 
has come from foreign ideas and agitators. 
12. Negroes have their rights, but it is best to keep them in 
their own districts and schools and to prevent too much con-
tact with whites. 
13. Filipinos are all right in their place, but they carry it 
too far when they dress lavishly and go around with white 
girls. 
14. There is something different and strange about Jews; it's 
hard to tell what they are thinking and planning, and what 
makes them tick. 
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15. Certain religious sects who refuse to salute the flag should 
be forced to conform to such a patriotic action, or else be 
abolisheci. 
16. Negro musicians may sometimes be as good as white musicians, 
but it is a mistake to have mixed Negro-white bands. 
17. The people who raise all the talk about putting Negroes on 
the same level as whites are mostly radical agitators trying 
to stir up conflicts. 
18. America may not be perfect, but the .American Way has brought 
us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect 
society. 
19. There may be a few exceptions, but in general Jews are pretty 
much alike. 
20. Beatniks prove that when people of their type have too much 
money and freedom, they just take advantage and cause trouble. 
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